This paper proposes an analytical framework to examine the role of public debt in …nancial development, which remains largely unexplored in the existing literature. We …nd that in countries where the banking sector extends substantial credit to government, public debt is likely to harm …nancial development, with unfavourable implications for economic activity. As such, our results provide an alternative explanation for the 'contractionary …scal expansions'. We also show that the lower the …nancial depth, the greater the adverse e¤ects of public borrowing on …nancial development and macroeconomic outcomes.
Introduction
Massive …scal stimulus packages put into place in the wake of the recent global …nancial crisis created renewed interest in …scal policy issues. An important aspect of …scal policy especially during major …scal expansions is related to the implications of budget de…cits and public debt, on which there is a substantial literature. One interesting …nding in this literature is that …scal expansions may be contractionary in countries where …nancial depth 1 is limited (see, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurty, 2004 and Christensen, 2005 ). Caballero and Krishnamurty (2004) present a model of external crisis in an environment with limited …nancial depth. In their model a rise in government expenditure crowds out private investment since expansionary …scal policy worsens the quality of the country's assets by reducing their liquidity and valuation. Their results overturn standard …s-cal policy prescriptions, pointing to the potential contractionary e¤ects of expansionary …scal policy.
In this paper we o¤er an alternative explanation for 'contractionary …s-cal expansions'by exploring a di¤erent channel through which …scal policy in ‡uences the …nancial sector and economic outcomes. We show that when the government has a dominant presence as a major borrower in the domestic securities market, a rise in public debt crowds out the funds available to the private sector -a key measure of …nancial development-which in turn reduces economic activity. 2 Although the determinants and the implications of …nancial development have been extensively analyzed, the potential role of …scal policy as a determinant of …nancial development has been largely ignored in the existing literature. One exception to this is Hauner (2009) who presents empirical evidence on the unfavourable impact of large …scal de…cits on …nancial development working through public sector borrowing from the banking sector. Our paper is the …rst that provides a theoretical framework on the role of public debt on …nancial development that may underlie such empirical evidence. 1 Financial depth is de…ned as supply of funds available to the government and the private sector. 2 Costs of …nancing large …scal de…cits in domestic securities markets, especially in countries where the …nancial depth is low and the banking sector is the dominant player in shaping the debt structure have been recently highlighted by Hauner (2008 Hauner ( , 2009 ) and Emran and Farazi (2009). 2 
The Basic Model
We utilize a simple, two-period policy-making model with monetary and …scal authorities and the banking sector. 3 
Policy makers'preferences
Consider a …scal policy-maker whose preferences can be summarized by the following loss function:
where L G t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the government, 1 and 2 represent, respectively, the government's relative dislikes for the deviations of in ‡ation ( t ) and public spending as a share of output (g t ) from their target levels (0 and g t respectively) relative to the deviations of output (x t ) from its target level (x t ) and G is the government's discount factor.
Monetary policy is made by an independent central bank (CB ) whose preferences can be described as:
where L CB t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the CB, 1 is the CB 's in ‡ation stability weight, CB is the CB 's discount factor. In addition, the CB is more conservative than the elected government; 1 > 1 and it does not discount the future at as high rate as the elected government; CB > G . Since the CB does not have any target for public spending, no terms relating to g t enter the CB 's loss function.
Output supply
Consider the following form of the production function: Y t = b A t N t , where Y t ; N t ; and b A t represent output, labor, and productivity, respectively, in period t and 0 < < 1: The representative competitive …rm's problem is to maximize pro…ts P t (1 t ) b A t N t W t N t , where P t is the price level, W t is the wage rate and t is the tax rate on the total revenue of the …rm in period t. The representative …rm chooses labor to maximize pro…ts by taking P t , W t and t as given. The resulting output supply function, utilizing w t = p e t , where superscripts e denote expectation, is y t = ( t + 1 a t e t t )+z;where e t is expected in ‡ation and lower case letters represent logs. We now turn to establishing the link between credit availability and real economic activity, as has long been recognized (see, for example, Levine, 1997) . One channel through which the availability of credit a¤ects the functioning of an economy is through its impact on productivity (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993) . It therefore follows that the productivity parameter, de…ned above, can be modi…ed as follows: b a t = b a 0 + l T t ; where l T t is the level of total bank credits to the private sector as speci…ed below, b a 0 is a constant and positive parameter and > 0. Substituting b a t into the output supply function derived above, normalizing output by subtracting the constant term z 0 = z + b a 0 = for simplicity yields the following normalized output supply function:
where x t denotes normalized output and = :
Demand for borrowing
Demand for borrowing is determined as an outcome of …scal and monetary policy decisions taken by the government and the independent CB, respectively. There are three sources of …nance for public spending; tax revenues, money creation and public borrowing. More formally, the budget constraint facing the government at time t is given by:
where d t 1 denotes the amount of single-period debt issued (as a ratio of output) in period t 1 and to be re-paid in period t, r t 1 represents the rate at which it is borrowed, d t is the new debt issue in period t and k is the real money holdings as share of output.
It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium outcome by utilizing backwards induction. Government and the independent CB play a Nash game in both periods to minimize their respective losses. Equilibrium values of in ‡ation, output and public borrowing, for given levels of r and l T ; are listed in Table 1 . Table 1 -Equilibrium Outcome in t = 1 and t = 2
) > 0 and (1 2 2 e ) > 0:
Supply of loanable funds
We now consider the determination of the supply of loanable funds available to the government and the private sector in this economy. Consider a …nancial sector that is composed of n banks. Banks compete with each other both in collecting deposits and in lending the collected funds. In the deposit market, the relationship between the deposit rate o¤ered by bank i and the supply of deposits facing the bank is summarized by the following:
where z i t is the deposit supply facing bank i , r zi t is the deposit rate o¤ered by bank i, r zj t is the vector of deposit rates paid by all other banks and A; and ! are positive parameters characterizing the structure of the deposit market. The parameter measures the sensitivity of deposit supply with respect to the deposit rate. The parameter ! measures the competitiveness of the banking sector; the higher is !, the more competitive is the banking sector in the deposit market.
The banking industry also competes for private sector borrowers. The demand function for loans facing bank i among the private sector borrowers is given by
where l i t denote the private sector demand for borrowing from bank i; r li t is the loan rate charged by bank i, r lj t is the vector of loan rates charged by all other banks and A l , " and are positive parameters that relate to the structure of the credit market.
Bank i's pro…t function can be written as
where n 1 = !(n 1)n and n 2 = (n 1)n:
Equilibrium in the bonds market
It is now straightforward to determine the bond rate, r t ; by combining the banks' total demand for bonds, b t = nb i t ; with the government's demand for borrowing (supply of bonds), d t . The bond rate adjusts till the demand for bonds is exactly matched by its supply thereby eliminating any excess demand for borrowing and thus any excess supply of bonds. More formally, in equilibrium
where E d t (r t ) denotes excess demand for borrowing expressed in terms of the bond rate; and d t (r t ) and b t (r t ); are, respectively, the demand for borrowing (supply of bonds) and the demand for bonds. It follows from above that @r t =@d t > 0 and @r t =@b t < 0:
Discussion
Let us now turn to the impact of public borrowing on the availability of credit to the private sector and the macroeconomic implications of this relationship. The framework developed above highlights the possibility of a …nancial crowding-out where government borrowing replaces private borrowing in the banking sector's loan portfolios. Given that bank credit to private sector is widely viewed as an important indicator of …nancial development, we can now establish the link between public debt and …nancial development.
Result 1. A rise in public sector borrowing from the banking sector reduces the scope of bank lending to the private sector and is therefore harmful for …nancial development. Moreover, the lower the …nancial depth, the greater the degree of public borrowing's crowding out of credit to the private sector.
Result 2. A fall in credit availability to the private sector is associated with a worse economic outcome in terms of higher in ‡ation and lower output both in current and future periods. 
Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the role of public debt on …nancial development that has so far remained unexplored in the existing literature. We have shown that in countries where credit to government makes up a major share of total bank lending, public debt is likely to harm …nancial development, with unfavourable implications for economic activity. As such, our results establish a potential contractionary e¤ect of …scal expansions especially in countries with limited …nancial depth and …nancial development, likely to be the case in emerging markets and other developing countries.
